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WAKE OF DEATH:1
How THE CURRENT MAC STANDARD
CIRCUMVENTS THE PURPOSE OF THE
MAC CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
In merger and acquisition negotiations, counsel of the acquirer and
the target dicker over many significant terms, especially those that
allocate risk among the parties. Material adverse change ("MAC")
and material adverse effect ("MAE")2 clauses are integral terms in
such agreements, notwithstanding the uncertainty about the effect and
meaning of these terms.3 These provisions address the threat of some-
thing occurring between the signing of the merger agreement and the
closing that adversely affects the value of the target. The MAE clause
plays an important role in determining whether an acquirer receives a
I WAKE OF DEATH (Sony Pictures 2004). The title of this Note was inspired by the movie
of the same name, starring international martial arts superstar Jean-Claude Van Damme, in
which Mr. Van Damme's character seeks revenge on his wife's murderers in the wake of her
death. For other movies in which Mr. Van Damme violently avenges the death of, or the serious
bodily harm inflicted upon, a loved one, see also BLOODSPORT (Warner Home Video 1988)
(wins the clandestine Kumite martial arts tournament by defeating Chong Li, the defending
champion who unnecessarily injured his friend's knee); KICKBOXER (Lions Gate 1989) (trains
with a master of the Muay Thai fighting style so that he can challenge Tong-Po, the fighter who
paralyzed his brother ); LIONHEART (Universal Studios 1991) (abandons his military post over-
seas, travels to America and fights in seedy underground street fights for money to support the
family of his recently murdered brother); DOUBLE IMPACT (MGM 1991) (teams up with his
long-lost identical twin to destroy the Hong Kong-based crime syndicate responsible for the
murder of his parents and the twins' separation); TIMECOP (Universal Studios 1994) (travels
back in time to prevent the murder of his pregnant wife and thereby alter history). But see HARD
TARGET (Universal Studios 1993) (avenges the death of a stranger primarily because of a finan-
cial interest).
2 While acquisition agreements may refer to "MAC" and "MAE," this Note will gener-
ally use the term "MAC" because of common usage, although "MAE" will be used where
appropriate.
3 See, e.g., Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI
Bus. L. REV. 219, 241 (2002) ("Some of the case law in this area is scary. The decisions inter-
preting MAC clauses are all over the lot, and some of the cases were quite clearly decided by
judges that are not familiar or comfortable with the finer points of M&A deals and acquisition
agreements." (quoting Richard E. Climan, Esq., of Cooley Godward, LLP)).
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company of lesser value than expected, is able to renegotiate a lower
price, or is simply able to walk away from the deal. Currently, Dela-
ware courts' interpretation of MAE clauses, as well as that state's test
for materiality ("Current MAC Standard"), allows the acquiring com-
pany to back out of a deal when events covered by the MAE clause
significantly impair the long-term earnings potential of the target.4
For example, in December of 2004, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) en-
tered into an agreement to acquire Guidant Corporation (Guidant) for
$25.4 billion in stock and cash, or $76 per share.5 The acquisition
agreement contained MAE provisions,6 which J&J later threatened to
invoke after certain circumstances affected Guidant in a manner that
J&J considered to be materially adverse. These events, which will be
described in detail below, demonstrate the problem of the Current
MAC Standard: its failure to consider the cause of the MAE, which, if
considered, might provide a more appropriate test for materiality be-
cause one of the purposes of the MAE is to hold the target responsible
for effects within its control and of which it has superior knowledge.
As it stands now, the Current MAC Standard destroys the purpose of
the MAE clause, since courts do not consider the cause of the adverse
effects, and courts place the burden of proof on the party alleging a
MAC to show a long-term impact on the target's earnings potential.
The target usually is the source of the problem because of its acts or
omissions, and therefore, has better knowledge of the causes and
long-term effects. Moreover, for companies competing in markets
boasting rapidly changing technology-such as the market for car-
diac-rhythm management devices in which Guidant and J&J com-
pete-any long-term financial information is either hard to gather or
not meaningful. Hence, the wake of death: in the wake of the Current
MAC Standard, courts are laying to waste a clause designed to shift
risk and hold parties accountable for their value-reducing acts.
This Note will use J&J's acquisition of Guidant to illustrate how
the Current MAC Standard destroys the purpose of the MAC clause.
4 In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig. (Tyson Foods), 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001), affid sub
nom. Tyson Foods v. Aetos Corp., 818 A.2d 145 (Del. 2003). The Delaware Chancery Court
adopted the Tyson Foods MAC standard as Delaware law in 2005. Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly
Corp., C.A. No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
5 Scott Hensley & Thomas M. Burton, Johnson & Johnson-Guidant Deal Constructs a
Cardiac Powerhouse, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2004, at B5.
6 Guidant Corp., Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger, § 3.01 (Form 8-
K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 18, 2005).
7 Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, J&J Receives FTC Clearance of Proposed Acquisi-
tion of Guidant Corporation and Provides Update on Transaction in Light of Guidant Recall
Events (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.jnj.com/news/jnj-news/20051102_093237.htm
(noting the product recalls and related regulatory investigations that could affect both the short
and long term prospects of the company).
424 [Vol. 57:2
20071 MAC STANDARD CIRCUMVENTS PURPOSE OF CLAUSE 425
Part I will introduce the purpose of including a MAC clause in a mer-
ger agreement and explain the function and evolution of MAC claus-
es. Part II will explain the materiality requirement for invoking the
MAC clause, the impact of prospective events and specificity, and the
definition of materiality under current case law, as well as lessons that
can be drawn therefrom. Part 111 will discuss the Guidant acquisition
saga for the purpose of providing a microscopic examination of how
MAC clauses actually affect high-profile transactions, as well as how
courts determine materiality in such transactions. Finally, Part IV will
argue that the Current MAC Standard destroys the purpose of the
MAC clause because it focuses solely on materiality. This part pro-
poses that by incorporating causation into the MAC Standard, in addi-
tion to refining the test for materiality, the legitimate purpose of the
MAC clause will be furthered because such changes would protect
the acquirer from the target's pre-signing, value-reducing actions, the
effects of which materialize post-signing. This Note concludes that a
better MAC standard--one that better serves the purposes of the
MAC clause-asks whether the target of the acquisition caused the
adverse events in question and whether the effect of the adverse event
is significant enough that the acquirer cannot invoke the MAC clause
as a mere pretext for backing out of an otherwise sound deal.
I. THE MERGER AGREEMENT AND THE MAC CLAUSE
A. The Merger Agreement
One function of a merger agreement is to allow the parties to allo-
cate the risks associated with acquiring the target company when
there is a delay between the signing of the agreement and the closing.8
This is usually the case in acquisitions involving public companies
because the transaction may require governmental and/or shareholder
approval, 9 not to mention extensive due diligence by the prospective
8 See, e.g., Richard A. Goldberg & Monique K. Moore, Negotiating the Purchase
Agreement, 2005 PRACTICING L. INST. GUIDE TO MERGERS & AcQuIsITIONs 425, 435-37. The
merger agreement also does the following: sets forth the principal financial terms of the transac-
tion and the rights and obligations of the parties, provides the acquirer with a detailed descrip-
tion of the target and affords remedies if the description proves to be inaccurate, and sets forth
the actions that the parties must perform to properly consummate the transaction. Id. at 433.
9 Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Contract Interpretation in Acquisition Agreements: The Content of
Material Adverse Change, INSIGHTS, Sept. 2001, at 2. Governmental and third-party approval is
necessary because:
In a merger, the seller must prepare, file, and circulate a proxy statement to its share-
holders. . . . Furthermore, almost every transaction is subject to the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, which will typically expire before the
shareholder vote or the closing of the tender offer. Anti-trust issues, however, could
provoke a second request and result in an extended delay.
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acquirer.' The parties allocate this risk through representations and
warranties, covenants, and closing conditions. The parties also in-
clude provisions-deal protection devices"-to prevent third parties
from interfering with the deal. One of the most important and heavily
negotiated provisions in the acquisition agreement is the MAC clause.
Usually found in the representations and warranties section of the
agreement, MAC provisions ideally make the target bear the risk of
pre-signing problems most within target's knowledge, and also insure
the acquirer against a low value realization for the new company,
should such pre-signing problems emerge during this timeframe. 12
B. The MAC Clause
1. The Function of the MAC Clause
Since one of the purposes the MAC clause is to shift risk, an obvi-
ous tension results between the acquirer and the target over the speci-
ficity of the language. 13 The acquirer wants a broad MAC clause so
that it has maximum leeway to walk away from the deal. 14 More prac-
Id.
10 See, e.g., Joan Harrison, Re-Jiggering the Price When Financials Change in Mid-Deal,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, April 2004, at 12 (noting that extensive due diligence lengthens the
time between the signing of the deal agreement and closing, which increases the probability that
terms of the deal will be renegotiated due to a change in the seller's financial situation during
this time period).
11 One such device, the "no-shop provision," prohibits the seller from soliciting offers
from other bidders, but the target usually insists on an exemption from the no-shop provision,
known as a "fiduciary out," which enables the seller to entertain unsolicited offers from other
parties, if the failure to do so would result in the seller's board of directors breaching the fiduci-
ary duties they owe to their shareholders. See, e.g., Goldberg & Moore, supra note 8, at 436-37.
The reason for this fiduciary out exemption is that parties to an acquisition may not contractu-
ally limit the board of directors' fiduciary duties through a no-shop provision. See Omnicare,
Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) (holding that a no-shop provision,
coupled with the presence of a majority shareholder voting agreement and the lack of a fiduciary
out clause, was an impermissible deal-protection device).
Another such device is the "termination fee," which requires the target to pay a specified
amount of money immediately to the acquirer if the target terminates the agreement for a certain
reason, such as the target deeming an alternative offer superior. Richard A. Goldberg, Maria
Gattuso & Nava Hazan, Negotiating the Purchase Agreement, 2001 PRACrISING L. INST.
STRUCTURING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 241,263.
12 Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisi-
tions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 334 (2005).
13 Without the MAC clause, the acquirer would rely on the representations and warranties,
as well as the bring-down condition, to protect it against something happening post-signing that
adversely affects the value of the target. The MAC provision "relates to that subset of [target]
actions that also would reduce the likelihood of a low value realization for the new company if
taken, though the failure to take such an action would not itself breach the bring-down condi-
tion." Id. Thus, without the MAC clause, the acquirer bears more risk.
14 Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy,
2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 846, 849.
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tically, however, a broad MAC clause acts as a bargaining chip for
the acquirer: 15 it gives the acquirer leverage to renegotiate the terms
of the agreement, viz., a more favorable price. 16 Thus, the occurrence
of an alleged MAC usually does not end the relationship because the
parties will renegotiate the price to reflect the MAC. 17 The target, on
the other hand, prefers a narrow MAC clause to ensure the deal closes
at the specified price. 18 The target also seeks generic exceptions to the
MAC clause in addition to exempting specific events of which it
might be aware.19
Despite the varying contexts in which parties negotiate acquisition
agreements, MAC clauses generally follow a pattern, due largely to
how MAC clauses emerged and how the judiciary has interpreted
them. First, agreements usually feature broad, even ambiguous, MAC
clauses2° with carve-outs or exceptions. 21 The exclusion of specific
events is particularly common in acquisition agreements involving
high-tech companies. 22 Second, parties aggregate the events, the cu-
mulative effect of which could lead to the occurrence of a MAC.23
Third, MAC provisions often feature forward-looking language to
15 Id.
16 See Sherri L. Toub, Note, "Buyer's Regret" No Longer: Drafting Effective MAC
Clauses in a Post-IBP Environment, 24 CARDoZO L. REV. 849, 853-54 (2003) (noting that
litigation is rarely the path of choice after an acquirer invokes the MAC clause).
17 Id. at 858. This is, in fact, what happened in the failed J&J-Guidant merger. Harrison,
supra note 10, at 12 ("Extended due diligence ... and regulatory hurdles lengthen the time
between the signing of the deal agreement and closing, leaving more time for the seller's finan-
cial situation to change in mid-deal and increasing the probability that a price adjustment will be
needed.").
18 Galil, supra note 14, at 849 (noting that the seller "normally aims for a narrow applica-
tion of the MAE clause and seeks to define its language accordingly").
19 Lou R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED AcQuISITIONS OF COMPANIES,
SUBSIDIARIES AND DivISIONS § 11.4[9] at 11-59 to -60 (2006). Generic exceptions often include
events or changes caused by general economic conditions, industry conditions, changes in
GAAP, and changes in governmental regulation. Although most acquirers resist these generic
exclusions, most agreements contain an exception for general economic conditions and industry
conditions. Id. § 11.4[91 at 11-60 to -62. Specific events of which the target might be aware
could include, for example, key customers or suppliers ending their relationships with the target.
Id. § 11.4[9] at 11-60 n.102.
20 See Kari K. Hall, How Big Is the MAC?: Material Adverse Change Clauses in Today's
Acquisition Environment, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1061, 1064 (2003) (noting that parties normally
draft broad MAC clauses, which the acquirer prefers).
21 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal-Usage Analysis of "Material Adverse Change"
Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 43 (2004). These exceptions, usually covering
exogenous risk, are a means of resolving the ambiguous language in the definition of MAE.
22 See Alana A. Zerbe, The Material Adverse Effect Provision: Multiple Interpretations &
Surprising Remedies, 22 J.L. & COM. 17, 31 (2002) (discussing the use of a MAC clause in a
1997 merger of high-tech companies).
23 Parties accomplish this by stating in the definition of a MAC that there has not been an
event or occurrence that, individually or in the aggregate, would reasonably be expected to
result in an MAE. See Adams, supra note 21, at 14-17 (discussing the issue of aggregation in
drafting MAC clauses).
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address events the effects of which have not fully materialized at the
time the acquirer attempts to back out of the deal. Thus, the MAC
clause covers events that "would reasonably be expected" to result in
an MAE.24 This language ideally provides the target with an incentive
not to engage in certain activities that would impair the value of the
combined company-even if the parties cannot immediately verify
those effects-because of the acquirer's credible threat of backing out
of the deal under the MAC clause.
2. Explanations for, and Evolution of, MAC Clauses
The MAC provision protects the acquirer from the target's pre-
signing actions that materialize post-signing, and it motivates the tar-
get to take post-signing actions that will preserve the value of the
combined enterprise.25 With the MAC clause, the target may make
post-signing efforts to preserve the expected profitability of the new
enterprise, retain the cohesiveness of the workforce, and facilitate
integration, among other post-signing efforts.26
Another explanation for MAC clauses is that they respond to the
acquirer's mutuality concerns that resulted from the economic 27 and
legal changes 28 of the 1980s, which transformed the merger agree-
ment into a put option29 for the target company. 30 In essence, these
economic and legal changes enabled the target to accept a higher
competing bid or to compel renegotiation of the price.31 A broadly
drafted MAC clause provides the acquirer with rights comparable to
the target's put and mitigates the acquirer's asymmetry concerns.32
The target thus has an incentive to offer a MAC clause to a potential
bidder because that bidder knows that it is not serving as a stalking
24 See, e.g., KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 11.4[9] at 11-67. Note that "would rea-
sonably be expected" is narrower than "could reasonably be expected." See infra note 38 and
accompanying text.
25 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 337.
26 Id.
27 See id. at 335 ("The capital market and transaction technology evolved such that financ-
ing for a competing bid could be raised before a friendly transaction could be closed, thus mak-
ing real the requirement that target shareholders approve the transaction.").
28 The emergence of the fiduciary out exception to the no-shop provision is an example of
one of these noteworthy legal changes. See Goldberg & Moore, supra note 8, at 430-40 (dis-
cussing deal-protection devices).
29 A "put option," also referred to as a "put," is defined as "[a]n option to sell something.
at a fixed price even if the market declines; the right to require another to buy." BLACK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1128 (8th ed. 2004).
30 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 335.
31 See id. ("[Aicquisitions require target shareholder approval, whether explicitly by vote
or implicitly by tender, and the target shareholders would refuse consent to an initial offer in the
face of another buyer's higher bid.").
32 Id. at 336.
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horse for the target. However, this theory is flawed because to create
a call option for the acquirer comparable to the target's put option, the
MAC clause "should shift to the target the risk of exogenously caused
reductions in the value of the new corporate combination., 33 MAC
clauses rarely do this.
The investment theory offers the best explanation for the use of
MAC clauses because it yields accurate predictions about MAC
clause drafting practices. Under the investment theory, "an efficient
acquisition agreement will impose endogenous risk on the seller and
exogenous risk on the buyer., 34 Indeed, parties have gravitated to-
wards this risk allocation scheme by, for example, excluding general
economic and industry conditions from the definition of the MAE.35
Under this risk allocation scheme, the MAC clause stands for the
principle of caveat emptor, except to the extent that the target caused
the events leading to the alleged MAE.
II. THE MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT
A. The Events That the MAC Clause Covers and the Meaning
of Materiality
1. Prospective Events and Specificity
Phraseology matters-it could make the difference between an ac-
quirer obtaining protection against a specific problem previously un-
known to it or having to live with the problem while proceeding with
the acquisition under the original agreement. 36 Thus, the MAC clause
should be both immediate-to cover events that have had an MAE-
and prospective-to cover events that would reasonably be expected
to result in an MAE.37 Even when using the "reasonably be expected
to" phrase, word selection still matters: "could" is presumably more
encompassing, whereas "would" suggests a greater likelihood of an
event resulting in a MAC, and therefore a higher burden for the party
alleging a MAC.38
33 Id. Exogenously caused risk includes general economic conditions and industry condi-
tions, two risks that are commonly exempted from the MAC clause. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
34 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 339.
35 Since the Delaware Chancery Court's decision in Tyson Foods, Delaware decisions
have reflected the position that if the parties desire that such exceptions apply, they must be
written into the agreement, and the court will not assume such exceptions. See Goldberg &
Moore, supra note 8, at 473.
36 KLING & NuGENT, supra note 19, § 11.04 at 11-27 (discussing the effects of specificity,
including prospective events).
37 Goldberg & Moore, supra note 8, at 473.
38 See Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., C.A. No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at
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A party invoking its rights under the MAC clause may benefit
from the general and straightforward language of a broadly drafted
MAC clause, given the tendency of courts to narrowly interpret more
specific provisions. 39 Arguably, "specificity carries its own risks,"
because "[tihe inclusion of a specific sub-clause relating to a particu-
lar topic may displace the more general language." 4 This risk, how-
ever, carries only a limited amount of significance. The Delaware
Chancery Court has said that, unless the MAC definition makes ex-
plicit references to specific events or exceptions, the court will not
interpret the clause as implicitly covering those events or excep-
tions.41 Given courts' penchant for narrowly interpreting MAC claus-
es, omission of a particular topic may exclude that topic from the
MAC definition.42
2. Materiality
There is no definitive test of whether a MAC has occurred.43 Mate-
riality depends on the context of the transaction and the language the
drafters chose. Moreover, the issue of whether an event is "material"
is normally a question of fact.44 Court decisions tend to be very fact-
intensive because of the varied and often ambiguous language in the
definition of a MAC.45
The vague language of broad MAC clauses yields two problems
for courts. First, a court must determine whether the MAC provision
covers the events in question. Second, a court must determine wheth-
er those events are material. Despite these problems, this much is
certain: just because an adverse event occurs that is serious enough to
*124 n.209 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (discussing the connotations of "would," "could," and
"might").
39 See Galil, supra note 14, at 857 ("[fln defining a[n MAE], specificity carries its own
risks.").
4 Id.
41 The merger agreement in Tyson Foods, the seminal case interpreting MAEs, did not
contain exceptions for the adverse effects of industry-wide conditions, and the court did not
agree with the acquirer that the MAE definition implicitly incorporated this carve-out. Tyson
Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 66 (Del. Ch. 2001), affid sub nom. Tyson Foods v. Aetos Corp., 818 A.2d
145 (Del. 2003).
42 See Galil, supra note 14, at 858 ("Failure to make any reference to a particular topic in
the agreement . ..will affirmatively count against inclusion of that topic in the [MAE]
definition.").
43 See, e.g., Goldberg & Moore, supra note 8, at 473.
4 See Fleischer, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that materiality may be determined as a matter
of law if the evidence is one-sided enough to create no genuine issue of material fact).
45 See Hall, supra note 20, at 1080 ("[T]he court record itself is typically very fact
intensive.").
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cause the acquirer to lower the price it is willing to pay does not mean
that there has been a "material adverse effect." 46
Other areas of law that address the meaning of materiality, such as
federal securities law, provide no guidance for MAC clauses.47 The
obvious problem is that a reasonable investor and a reasonable ac-
quirer might have different criteria for determining whether some-
thing is important. Moreover, the meaning of materiality will depend
48
upon context, even when dealing with the same company. 8 Thus, a
"reasonable shareholder" or other objective standard may be imprac-
tical for determining whether a MAC has occurred because of the
varied contexts of acquisitions. Undoubtedly, the Current MAC Stan-
dard is harder to satisfy than mere materiality required under federal
securities laws.49 A reasonable investor, such as an arbitrageur, pre-
sumably invests to turn a quick profit, whereas a reasonable acquirer
presumably invests to capture the potential synergies of a new enter-
prise. 50 In other words, what is important from the short-term perspec-
tive of an investor might not be important from the long-term per-
spective of an acquirer.
Parties may attempt to quantify the impact necessary to result in a
material adverse effect. Because parties have difficulty agreeing on a
dollar level of adversity, however, this is not a practical solution: the
acquirer wants a low level while the target wants a high level. For
example, if the target suggests that an earnings decrease of fifty per-
cent is material, the acquirer might interpret this as the target expect-
ing a forty-nine percent decrease in earnings. To overcome this stand-
still, the parties may ultimately define "MAC" as meaning "material
adverse effect," leaving the meaning of materiality subject to the
courts' later interpretation.
46 KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 11.4[9] at 11-63.
47 Under the test for materiality that the United States Supreme Court has articulated, a
fact is material "if a reasonable shareholder would consider it important." TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1979).
48 See, e.g., KLING & NUGENT, supra note 19, § 11.03 at 11-21.
49 Id. § 11.04[91 at 11-66 n. 123 and accompanying text.
SO See generally RONALD J. GILsON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE AcQuISITIONs, 258 (2d ed. 1995) ("Synergies of various sorts--operating, finan-
cial, or managerial-are the most common explanation offered by the acquirer's managers for
an acquisition.").
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B. The Effect of Case Law on the Meaning of Materiality
1. The Seminal Case-Tyson Foods
The seminal case interpreting MAC clauses is In re IBP, Inc.,
Shareholders Litigation.51 In this case, Tyson Foods won a bidding
war for IBP, and on January 1, 2001, the parties entered into an
agreement whereby Tyson Foods would acquire IBP. 52 The
acquisition agreement defined a MAC as "any event, occurrence or
development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or
reasonably could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect...
on the condition (financial or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities
or results of operations of [IBP] and [its] subsidiaries taken as a
whole .... The definition of MAE did not exclude exogenous
factors like changes to the U.S. economy or to IBP's industry. Shortly
after the signing, IBP experienced business problems: an accounting
fraud at an IBP subsidiary resulted in an impairment charge54 and [BP
failed to meet earnings expectations for the first quarter of 2001.
Ostensibly feeling that it overpaid, Tyson Foods terminated the
agreement by sending a letter to IBP and litigation ensued.56
Applying New York law, the Delaware Chancery Court held that
the impairment charge and earnings decrease did not constitute
MAEs.57 The court noted that "Tyson's publicly expressed reasons for
terminating the Merger did not include an assertion that IBP had suf-
fered a Material Adverse Effect," and that Tyson Foods gave "no
weight" to the IBP subsidiary in negotiations.58 The court placed the
burden of proof on Tyson Foods as the party invoking the MAC,59
and concluded that "a buyer ought to have to make a strong showing
to invoke [a MAC] exception to its obligation to close." 6 The court
held that materiality should be "viewed from the longer-term perspec-
51 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Tyson Foods v. Aetos Corp., 818 A.2d 145
(Del. 2003).
52 Id. at 21.
53 Id. at 65 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
54IBP ultimately restated its warranted financials to reflect an impairment charge of $60.4
million. Id. at 49.
55 IBP's first-quarter earnings for 2001 suffered a 64% decrease from the same period in
2000. Id. at 69.
56 Recent Case, In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 18373,
2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81 (June 15, 2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1738-39 (2002).
57 Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d at 71.
58 Id. at 65.
59 Id. at 53.
60 Id. at 68.
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tive of a reasonable acquiror." 6t Thus, short-term earnings decreases
and a one-time impairment charge were not material.
The court then articulated its two-pronged standard, stating that the
MAC clause "is best read as a backstop protecting the acquirer
from... unknown events that substantially threaten the overall earn-
ings potential of the target in a durationally-significant manner."62
The court established that Tyson Foods knew, ex ante, of the events
and occurrences it later alleged as material, and thus failed the first
prong of the MAC standard because Tyson Foods was aware of IBP's
subsidiary's accounting practices and possible impairment charge and
because it had access to data that showed the cyclical nature of IBP's
business.63 Tyson Foods also failed to satisfy the second prong of the
test because it presented no expert evidence showing a "diminution in
IBP's value or earnings potential." 64
2. The Current State of the MAC Standard-Frontier Oil
The Delaware Chancery Court articulated a high burden for a party
seeking to invoke the MAC provision in Tyson Foods.65 In Frontier
Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 66 the Delaware Chancery Court extended
the Tyson Foods holding to Delaware law.67 In that case, Holly
Corporation ("Holly") had entered into a merger agreement with
Frontier Oil Corporation ("Frontier Oil"). During due diligence, Holly
discovered that activist Erin Brockovich, among others, was
61 Id. This "reasonable acquiror" standard highlights the notion that what may be material
from a federal securities law perspective under a "reasonable investor" standard may not reach
the required showing of materiality contemplated by the MAE clause. To a reasonable acquiror:
[T]he important thing is whether the company has suffered a Material Adverse Effect
in its business or results of operations that is consequential to the company's earn-
ings power over a commercially reasonable period, which one would think would be
measured in years rather than months. It is odd to think that a strategic buyer would
view a short-term blip in earnings as material, so long as the target's earnings-
generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or that blip's cause.
Id. at 67.
62 Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 61-62.
64 Id. at 69. Moreover, the analysis of Tyson Foods' own investment banker showed that,
even when factoring in the alleged MAEs, the acquisition presented "great long-term value for
Tyson." Id. at 70.
65 In concluding that Tyson Foods had failed to show a MAC, Vice Chancellor Strine
commented that, if IBP had borne the burden of showing an absence of a MAC, it would not
have met that burden. Id. at 72 n.172.
6 C.A. No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005). Although this is an
unreported case, Delaware permits the citation of such cases. DEL. Sup. CT. R. 93(d)(ii), DEL.
CH. CT. R. 171(h). In any event, the fact that Delaware adopted the Tyson Foods standard in an
unpublished opinion gives Delaware courts the opportunity to revisit the Tyson Foods standard
and incorporate the test for materiality that this Note proposes.
67 In adopting the Tyson Foods MAE standard, the court saw "no reason why the law of
Delaware should prescribe a different perspective." Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at * 128.
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spearheading a toxic tort suit against a subsidiary of Frontier Oil and
other parties. 68 To assuage Holly's fears about the suit, the parties
modified their agreement, adding a litigation-specific MAC
provision69 whereby Frontier Oil represented that "there are no
actions, suits or proceedings pending against Frontier or any of its
Subsidiaries or, to Frontier's knowledge, threatened against Frontier
or any of its Subsidiaries.. . other than those that would not have or
reasonably expected to have, individually or in the aggregate," an
MAE.
70
After Holly's board of directors approved the modified agreement,
it soon succumbed to buyer's remorse. First, a California law firm
filed suit against both Frontier Oil and its subsidiary.71 Second, doc-
uments revealed that Frontier Oil was the guarantor and indemnitor of
any liabilities its subsidiary would incur in the lawsuit, meaning that
Frontier Oil might be directly liable, losing the protection of the cor-
porate veil.72 Holly considered these developments to be reasonably
likely to result in an MAE, and thus it became hesitant about execut-
ing the agreement. Frontier Oil claimed that Holly had anticipatorily
repudiated the agreement and sued for specific performance, while
Holly counterclaimed for wrongful repudiation because, in fact, it had
not yet invoked the MAC, and for breach of representations and war-
ranties.73 Tactically, by claiming repudiation against Holly, Frontier
Oil deprived Holly of the opportunity to declare an MAE until it was
defending itself in the suit.
74
Following the lead of Tyson Foods, the Frontier Oil court made
several important decisions that were outcome-determinative. First, it
noted that, under the "would have" or "would reasonably be expected
to have" language of the MAC clause, the test for showing an MAE is
an objective one.75 Second, the court placed on Holly the burden of
demonstrating that the litigation constituted an MAE.76 Ultimately,
the court held that Holly had not proven that the litigation would rea-
68 Id. at *7-8.
69 The benefit of an event-specific MAC provision is that it ensures that a court, because
of its tendency to narrowly interpret MAC clauses, has less discretion in determining whether
the provision covers the events at issue.
70 Id. at *15 (first emphasis added). The agreement defined an MAE as "a material ad-
verse effect with respect to ... the business, assets and liabilities (taken together), results of
operations, conditions (financial or otherwise) or prospects ..... Id. at *126. The definition
excluded MAEs resulting from economic or industry changes. Id.
71 Id. at *39--44.
72 Id.
73 Id. at *80-92.
74 Id. at *105.
75 Id. at *124.
76 Id. at *131.
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sonably be expected to be an MAE. Even though the court recognized
that the litigation posed serious-and possibly catastrophic-threats
to Frontier Oil,77 "the mere existence of a lawsuit cannot be determi-
native" of a MAC.78 Holly failed to produce sufficient evidence to
permit the court to "make a reasonable and an informed judgment of
the probability of an outcome on the merits. '79 Thus, the holding in
Frontier Oil incorporated the Tyson Foods MAE standard into Dela-
ware law, a forum in which future MAE litigation will likely occur
since so many companies are incorporated there.8 °
3. A Framework, but Not a Cogent Standard
Tyson Foods, Frontier Oil, and other MAE clause cases provide a
framework with which to assess a MAC argument, but they do not
necessarily produce a cogent standard for determining when an ad-
verse event reaches the required degree of materiality. In other words,
courts tend to employ similar schemas notwithstanding the ambiguity
of the definition of materiality. First, the court must determine if the
definition of a MAC covers the events in question, and second, if so,
whether the adverse effect of that event is material. In resolving these
two questions, the inquiry is typically fact-intensive, 81 and the court
will look to external facts and parol evidence.82 Third, the party alleg-
ing the MAE has the burden of proof. If the MAE clause contains
forward-looking language, such as "would reasonably be expected,"
that party must show a high probability of adverse consequences to
the long-term earnings potential of the target from the perspective of a
reasonable acquirer.
This standard fails to recognize the purpose of a MAC clause, be-
cause under a MAC clause, the target should bear the cost of endoge-
77 Id. at *133-36.
78 Id. at *137 n.224.
79 Id. at *136.
80 See, e.g., William R. Kucera, MAE Clauses Might Not Avert a Bad Deal, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 7, 2005, at S1 (noting that Tyson Foods and Frontier Oil offer considerable guidance on
how Delaware courts will interpret MAC closing conditions). Although Delaware is the state of
incorporation for many public companies, acquisition agreements may contain choice of law
provisions electing the law of another state. For example, the Delaware Chancery Court applied
New York law in the Tyson Foods case, as per the agreement. See Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 57, at *127-28. The parties to the aborted Guidant-J&J acquisition agreement chose to
resolve any legal disputes under Indiana law. Guidant Corp., Amended and Restated Agreement
and Plan of Merger, § 8.08 (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 18, 2005). States other than Dela-
ware, however, may not have case law on point, and thus may look to Delaware law as persua-
sive authority.
S See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (noting that the materiality determina-
tion, as well as court decisions relating to such determinations, are heavily fact intensive).
82 Jonathon M. Grech, Comment, "Opting Out": Defining the Material Adverse Change
Clause in a Volatile Economy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1483, 1500-01 (2003).
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nous risk. The standard articulated in Tyson Foods and Frontier Oil,
however, focuses solely on materiality and disregards the cause of the
alleged MAE. The effect of this interpretation is that the target is off
the hook for its pre-signing actions, even though it should bear the
cost of these actions, as per the MAE clause. Since the burden of
proof is on the party invoking the MAE-the acquirer in most cas-
es-the target has an incentive not to disclose information pertaining
to its acts or omissions that caused the alleged MAE. For example, if
Guidant were aware of defects in some of its devices and did not dis-
close this to anyone-J&J or governmental entities-then that lack of
information would not affect the strength of J&J's MAE argument
because causation is not relevant. On the other hand, if Guidant were
to disclose such information, it would affect the price J&J would be
willing to pay for Guidant, but, again, it would not impact the MAE
argument. By not factoring in causation, the Current MAC Standard
lets Guidant off the hook for its value-reducing, pre-signing actions.
III. THE GUIDANT ACQUISITION SAGA AND THE
MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT
A. The Guidant Acquisition Saga
1. The Original Deal and the Need to Renegotiate
In December 2005 J&J agreed to acquire Guidant for $25.4 billion
in cash and stock and thereby "create the largest supplier of medical
devices to heart specialists. 83 The strategic motive of J&J was that
acquiring Guidant would allow it to exploit the profitable and grow-
ing market for implantable defibrillators and pacemakers that J&J had
not yet entered.84 Guidant was the market leader,85 especially in the
fastest-growing category of such devices--defibrillators for patients
with congestive heart failure.86 Moreover, this cutting-edge subset of
83 Hensley & Burton, supra note 5.
8 J&J did not manufacture pacemakers or implantable defibrillators, the crown jewels in
Guidant's product line. Id. Also, the companies emphasized that the rationale for the acquisition
was growth, not cost-cutting. Id.
85 Guidant's defibrillator sales represented about thirty-five percent of the U.S. market,
making Guidant the second largest producer of defibrillators. Thomas M. Burton, Guidant Pulls
5 Defibrillator Models; Safety Concerns Sideline Firm from Crucial Market; J&J's Deal Could
Change, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005, at B2 [hereinafter Safety Concerns].
8 Pacemakers use small electrical impulses to correct slow or irregular heartbeats, whe-
reas defibrillators detect and treat abnormally fast heartbeats that could result in sudden cardiac
arrest. Guidant Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 44 (Feb. 22, 2006). Defibrillators for
patients with congestive heart failure perform an additional function-cardiac resynchronization
therapy-a process that "involves the delivery of small electrical impulses to two chambers of
the heart, so the organ will pump in a more coordinated way and deliver more blood to the
body." Thomas M. Burton, Guidant Plans to Resume Sales of Key Defibrillators This Week,
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defibrillators was "considered especially crucial, because they are
among the most expensive and fastest-growing products on the defi-
brillator market., 87 The agreement required Guidant shareholder ap-
proval, as well as antitrust clearance, before closing.
The acquisition agreement contained several deal-protection de-
vices, including a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out clause 88 and
a termination fee in the event Guidant abandoned the agreement.89
The representations and warranties were substantial and contained
many event-specific MAE provisions, in addition to one general
MAE clause.90 Much like the agreement in Frontier Oil, this agree-
ment had a MAC provision that specifically addressed pending or
threatened litigation. The agreement defined "Material Adverse Ef-
fect" as "any change, effect, event, occurrence, state of facts or devel-
opment which individually or in the aggregate would reasonably be
expected to result in any change or effect, that is materially adverse to
the business, financial condition or results of operations" of Gui-
dant.9' The definition of a MAC excluded general economic condi-
tions and Guidant's industry conditions.92
Starting in the summer of 2005, a number of events occurred that
ultimately led J&J to invoke the MAE clause. Citing safety concerns,
on June 24, 2005, Guidant pulled five models of defibrillators off the
market after it discovered a rare malfunction in a small number of its
products. 93 The move effectively precluded Guidant from competing
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2005, at B3 [hereinafter Resume Sales].
87 Thomas M. Burton, Guidant's Profit Falls 15%, Defibrillator Fix Is Seen, WALL ST. J.,
July 22, 2005, at A3 [hereinafter Profit Falls]. Specifically, the defibrillators for patients with
congestive heart failure cost around $25,000-$30,000 each, and the market has experienced a
fifty percent annual growth rate. Burton, supra note 86. The overall market for defibrillators had
a forecasted annual growth rate of twenty percent. Id.
88 The no-shop provision stated that Guidant could not "solicit, initiate or knowingly en-
courage, or take any other action designed to, or which reasonably could be expected to, facili-
tate" any proposal or offer from another party relating to an acquisition. Guidant Corp,
Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 4.02 (Nov.
18, 2005). The fiduciary out clause provided that "in response to a bona fide written Takeover
Proposal that the Board of Directors of [Guidant] reasonably deternines (after consultation with
outside counsel and a financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation) constitutes . . . a
Superior Proposal," Guidant may furnish information to, and participate in discussions with, the
party making such Takeover Proposal. Id.
89 If Guidant terminated the agreement, other than following the occurrence of a MAC,
then Guidant was required to pay J&J a termination fee of $625 million. Id § 5.06(b).
90 Provisions employing MAC clauses included representations and warranties relating to,
among other contexts, the "Absence of Certain Changes or Events," "Litigation," and "Regula-
tory Compliance." Id § 3.01(g), (h), (u).
91 Id. § 8.03(c).
92 Id.
93 Burton, Safety Concerns, supra note 85. The malfunction, affecting four of about forty-
six thousand manufactured devices, occurs when an internal magnetic switch becomes stuck in a
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in the market for defibrillators for patients with congestive heart fail-
ure because two of the five devices recalled belonged to this special
subset.94 Less than a month later, Guidant issued a statement that
some of its pacemakers might leak and fail to work and that these
might need to be removed from patients.95 This and the earlier disclo-
sures by Guidant caused concern among cardiologists regarding Gui-
dant's quality control.9 6 The product recalls and warnings reduced
Guidant's net income for the second quarter by fifteen percent from a
year earlier; affecting this figure was a $113 million charge that Gui-
dant suffered from the recalls of several models of defibrillators.97 By
mid-October, Guidant's warnings and recalls had reached nearly one
hundred thousand of its defibrillators and pacemakers. 98 Guidant and
J&J met in early November to discuss the pending acquisition. The
MAE provisions served their purpose, and J&J's credible threat to
terminate the agreement led to a price renegotiation.
2. The Bidding War and Other Developments
The decision by J&J to renegotiate the merger agreement sparked
a heated bidding war with Boston Scientific Corporation (Boston
Scientific). Guidant and J&J negotiations broke down on November
1, 2005 (J&J offered about $61 per share, while Guidant asked around
$67 per share), and the two companies promptly notified the world of
their MAE stances.99 Guidant filed a lawsuit against J&J in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking
specific performance of the acquisition. 1° J&J asserted that, under the
MAE provisions of the agreement, it was not required to close.
particular position and the device then fails to deliver the needed electrical impulse. Burton,
Resume Sales, supra note 86.
94 Burton, Safety Concerns, supra note 85.
95 Thomas M. Burton, Guidant Issues Warning on Its Older Pacemakers, WALL ST. J., Ju-
ly 19, 2005, at D6.
96 See Burton, Profit Falls, supra note 87 ("[Tlhere might be a fundamental quality-
assurance problem with this company." (quoting William T. Abraham, M.D., Chief of Cardiol-
ogy at The Ohio State University)).
97 Id. At the same time it announced the profit decrease, Guidant also announced it had
discovered a remedy for the rare malfunction in its defibrillators. Id.
98 Scott Hensley, Thomas M. Burton & Dennis K. Berman, J&J Is Weighing Its Alterna-
tives on Guidant Deal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A3. Part of the problem related to the
warnings and recalls was the fact that Guidant did not notify cardiologists of a malfunctioning
device until after a patient had died. Id.
99 Scott Hensley & Dennis K. Berman, J&J Presses Guidant on Takeover Price, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 3, 2005, at A3.
10°Press Release, Guidant Corp., Guidant Initiates Suit for Specific Performance: Com-
pany Reports Third Quarter Sales of $795 Million (Nov. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.guidant.com/news/500/web-release/nr000591.shtml.
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Specifically, J&J viewed Guidant's product recalls and related
regulatory investigations and other circumstances "as serious matters
affecting both Guidant's short-term results and long-term outlook,"
and it stated that "those events have had a material adverse effect on
Guidant."'0 '
By this time, Guidant's problems had impacted its image and bot-
tom-line. First, Guidant reported a third-quarter decrease in net in-
come of fourteen percent, citing the "temporary unavailability of our
leading cardiac resynchronization-defibrillator devices during the full
month of July and part of August" as causes of the slide. 102 Second,
industry experts estimated that Guidant's market share for defibrilla-
tors had dropped from thirty-seven percent to thirty-two percent.
10 3
Third, the New York Attorney General had sued Guidant, and the
Attorneys General of Arizona, Oregon, and Illinois had commenced
investigations of Guidant on behalf of thirty-four states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia regarding Guidant's failure to notify doctors and
patients of a defibrillator malfunction. 104 In addition, nearly forty-five
product liability class action lawsuits and nearly fifty individual law-
suits had been filed against Guidant in various state and federal courts
in response to its recalls and warnings. 05
J&J cited Guidant' s problems to demand a fifteen percent discount
off the original deal.'6 On November 14, 2005, the parties agreed
J&J would acquire Guidant for $21.5 billion, or $63.08 per share.'0 7
This renegotiation, however, opened the door for a bidding war. On
December 5, 2005, seeing an opportunity to enter the implantable
cardiac defibrillator market with its twenty percent annual growth
101 Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, J&J Statement Regarding Guidant Corporation Civ-
il Suit (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://www.jnj.comlnewsljnj-news/20051107_103603.htm.
102 Press Release, Guidant Corp., supra note 100. Specifically, Guidant's worldwide defi-
brillator sales decreased in the third quarter of 2005 by twenty-six percent, and U.S. sales de-
creased by thirty-one percent. Id.
103 Hensley & Berman, supra note 99. Despite this drop in market share, a Piper Jaffray
medical device analyst expected Guidant to regain most, if not all, of its market share by the end
of the first quarter of 2006. Thomas M. Burton, Guidant Sues J&J in Bid to Keep Pact, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at A3.
104 Guidant Corp., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q), at 29 (Nov. 7, 2005).
105 Id. at 29.
106 Scott Hensley & Thomas M. Burton, J&J, Guidant Skip Courtroom, Set Deal, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 16, 2005, at A3.
107 Id.
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rate, 0 8 Boston Scientific offered to acquire Guidant for $25 billion, or
$72 per share. 1°9
Following this bid, more bad news and bidding ensued. Less than
two weeks after the bid, Guidant announced that seven patients with
recalled implanted defibrillators had died when its devices
malfunctioned." 0 On December 23, 2005, Guidant announced that its
fourth-quarter sales would not meet Wall Street's expectations."' It
disclosed four days later that it had received a warning letter from the
Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding an
inspection of a Guidant cardiac-rhythm management facility. 1 2 These
problems notwithstanding, and after due diligence, Boston Scientific
made a formal offer to Guidant for $25 billion in early January
2006.113 On January 13, 2006, Guidant rejected this "larger but
potentially more time-consuming"'"14 offer in favor of a new offer
from J&J to acquire Guidant for $24.2 billion, or $71 per share." 15
Boston Scientific finally ended the bidding war on January 17,
2006, with an offer of $27 billion, or $80 per share, a premium of $9
per share over J&J's latest offer." 6 To achieve this coup de grace,
Boston Scientific entered into a conditional agreement with Abbott
Laboratories ("Abbott"), under which Abbott would provide nearly
$6.2 billion of the acquisition price, and Boston Scientific would di-
108 Dennis K. Berman, Sylvia Pagan Westphal & Thomas M. Burton, Boston Scientific
Vies for Guidant; Offer of $25 Billion Trumps Johnson & Johnson's Deal; Bidding War May
Erupt, WALL ST. J., December 6, 2005, at A3. Boston Scientific had strong cardiovascular,
endosurgery, and neuromodulation businesses, but it had no presence in the cardiac-rhythm
management market, and the acquisition would make Boston Scientific the world's largest
developer of heart devices. Id.
109 Id.
"
0 Guidant Says More Patient Deaths Are Linked to Product Failures, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, Dec. 14, 2005 (copy on file with author).
I Guidant Cuts Outlook Amid Heart-Device Fallout, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2005, at A2.
112 Press Release, Guidant Corp., Guidant Announces FDA Warning Letter Related to
Prior FDA Inspection of St. Paul Facility; Company Will Promptly and Fully Respond to FDA
(Dec. 27, 2005), available at http://www.guidant.connews/600/webreleaselnr._000603.shtml.
The letter, citing some 483 observations regarding non-compliance, resulted from an extensive
FDA investigation at the cardiac-rhythmic management facility completed on September 1,
2006. Id. The FDA performed another investigation between December 15, 2005 and Febru-
ary 9, 2005 that resulted in only one observation. Guidant Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
12 (Feb. 22, 2006).
113Sylvia Pagan Westphal, Thomas M. Burton & Dennis K. Berman, Boston Scientific
Formalizes Bid to Buy Guidant, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2006, at A3.
1 4 Thomas M. Burton & Dennis K. Berman, Guidant Accepts a New J&J Offer, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2006, at A3. A Guidant-Boston Scientific merger would potentially pose anti-
trust issues because of the two companies' overlapping businesses. See Fleischer, supra note 9,
at 2 (discussing the impact of the Hart-Scot-Rodino Act).
15 Burton & Berman, supra note 114.
116 Dennis K. Berman, Thomas M. Burton & Sylvia Pagan Westphal, Boston Scientific
Leaps Past J&J with $27 Billion Bid for Guidant, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2006, at Al.
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vest certain Guidant businesses to Abbott. 1 7 On January 23, 2006,
Guidant expanded its recall for pacemakers, disclosing that the failure
rate in some models exceeded earlier findings.118 Two days later,
Guidant's board of directors approved the $27 billion offer from Bos-
ton Scientific." 19
B. The Materiality Issue-Whether Guidant Suffered MAEs
1. Hypothetical Scenario: No Renegotiations, No Offer from
Boston Scientific
The MAE argument that J&J would have made if it had proceeded
to trial is a perfect example of the problem with the Current MAC
Standard. That Boston Scientific, a reasonable acquirer, ultimately
paid $1.6 billion over the price of the original deal-knowing of the
alleged MAEs-cuts against J&J's MAE argument. The objective of
this subsection is to apply the Current MAC Standard to a
hypothetical situation in which no renegotiations occurred and Boston
Scientific never intervened. Thus, this experiment addresses the issue
of whether the Current MAC Standard achieves the intentions of the
parties, namely, allocating interim risk and motivating the parties to
take actions to prevent a decline in the target's value as well as
holding target companies accountable for internally-caused adverse
effects.
As an initial matter, an acquirer's public statements regarding a
target's MAEs might affect a court's disposition towards, and the
credibility of, its MAE argument. When interpreting MAE provisions,
courts recognize that the acquirer may succumb to buyer's remorse
following an auction and invoke the MAE clause merely as pretext
for undoing a dubious decision. This suspicion obviously works
against the acquirer, but perhaps unfairly; after all, the MAE clause
and the acquirer's exit rights thereunder force the target not to engage
in activities that might negatively affect the value of company.1 20 Not
only does the MAE clause deter certain post-signing behavior, it also
makes the target bear the burden of pre-signing problems, of which it
has more knowledge than the acquirer.
1
7 Dennis K. Berman, Thomas M. Burton & Sylvia Pagan Westphal, How Boston Scien-
tific Beat J&J, Audacious $80-a-Share Offer for Guidant Cinched the Deal; Crafty Plans by
'the General', WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2006, at Cl. This agreement also had the effect of lessening
the regulatory hurdles because the divestiture of Guidant businesses removed the anti-trust
issues.' 8 Guidant Widens Device Recall; Failure Rate Rises, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at B2.
l11 Press Release, Guidant Corp., Boston Scientific and Guidant Announce Signing of
Merger Agreement Valued at $27 Billion (Jan. 25, 2006), available at http://www.guidant.com/
news/600/webrelease/n_000616.shtml.
120 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 356-57.
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Careful to avoid the "buyer's remorse" aura, J&J learned from the
Tyson Foods case,121 and its reasons for backing out of the original
deal with Guidant incorporated the magic words. According to J&J,
Guidant's product recalls and related regulatory investigations, as
well as other circumstances, were MAEs seriously affecting Gui-
dant's long-term outlook. 122 After the chancery court's comments in
Tyson Foods, this public statement would ostensibly bolster J&J's
MAE argument.
2. Whether the Agreement Covers the Relevant Events
The first question about J&J's MAE argument is whether the MAE
provisions would cover the type of events or state of facts cited by
J&J. The broad MAE provision stated that, among other things, "there
has not been any ... Material Adverse Change. 1 23 Two of the nar-
rower MAE clauses concerned "Regulatory Compliance' 124 and "Lit-
igation."1 25 The former covered actions by governmental entities,
121 Tyson Foods' publicly stated reasons for not closing did not include a MAC. Tyson
Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 65 (2001), aff'd sub nor. Tyson Foods v. Aetos Corp., 818 A.2d 145 (Del.
2003). The Delaware Chancery Court viewed Tyson Foods' actions as inconsistent with its
MAE argument and more demonstrative of buyer's remorse. Id. at 22.
122 Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, supra note 101.
123 Guidant Corp., Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger, § 3.01 (Form 8-
K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 18, 2005). The agreement defined MAE and MAC as "any change, effect,
event, occurrence, state of facts or development which individually or in the aggregate would
reasonably be expected to result in any change or effect, that is materially adverse to the busi-
ness, financial condition or results of operations" of Guidant. Id. § 8.03(c).
124The Regulatory Compliance representation contained two relevant provisions. First,
that:
No medical device is under consideration by senior management of [Guidant] ...
for, or has been recalled, withdrawn, suspended, seized or discontinued (other than
for commercial or other business reasons) by, [Guidant] .... No proceedings... of
which [Guidant] has Knowledge (whether completed or pending) seeking the recall,
withdrawal, suspension, seizure or discontinuance of any Medical Device are pend-
ing against [Guidant] ... which individually or in the aggregate have had or would
reasonably be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect.
Id. § 3.01(u)(ii).
The second relevant provision stated that Guidant has not:
[R]eceived any written notice that the FDA or any other Governmental Entity has ...
commenced, or threatened to initiate, any action to enjoin the production of any
Medical Device. . . except for any such action that individually or in the aggregate
has not had and would not reasonably be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect.
Id. § 3.01(u)(vi).
125 The Litigation representation stated:
[Tihere is no suit, action or proceeding pending or, to the Knowledge of [Guidant],
threatened against or affecting [Guidant] ... or any of [its] respective assets that
individually or in the aggregate has had or would reasonably be expected to have a
Material Adverse Effect, nor is there any demand, letter or Order of any
Governmental Entity... against, or, to the Knowledge of [Guidant], investigation by
any Governmental entity involving.. . [Guidant] ... or any of [its] respective assets
that individually or in the aggregate has had or would reasonably be expected to have
a Material Adverse Effect.
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such as the FDA, while the latter covered legal actions initiated by
private individuals as well as governmental entities.126 The events
cited by J&J for its MAE argument included product recalls of nearly
three hundred thousand Guidant heart devices linked to malfunctions
(and the seven patient deaths attributed specifically to faulty wiring in
Guidant's defibrillators); 127 regulatory investigations stemming from
the recalls and advisories in 2005 by the FDA, U.S. Department of
Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and various state
agencies; product liability lawsuits filed against Guidant (individual
and class action); and earnings and sales decreases for three consecu-
tive quarters in 2005 (collectively known as the "Events").
The event-specific MAE clauses would cover the recalls and re-
lated regulatory investigations as well as the lawsuits that affected
Guidant. First, the product recalls would fall under the Regulatory
Compliance MAE Provision that specifically mentions recalls. Gui-
dant initiated a recall on defibrillators for patients with congestive
heart failure not for commercial reasons but rather because it discov-
ered a rare malfunction and because two patient deaths had already
been linked to Guidant product failures. Guidant eventually widened
the recall to include some of its pacemakers. Second, the Litigation
Provision undoubtedly covers the regulatory investigations because
the representation explicitly refers to government investigations. The
Litigation Provision would also cover the various product liability
lawsuits, as well as the civil suit that the New York Attorney General
commenced on November 2, 2005, alleging that Guidant concealed
the malfunction from physicians in breach of the state's consumer
protection laws. 128 Thus, the various MAE provisions, because of
their specific language, would cover the recalls, investigations, and
lawsuits. J&J would cite Guidant's worse-than-expected financial
results as evidence of the materiality of the adverse effects of the liti-
gation and product recalls.
J&J would also cite Guidant's financial performance results as fal-
ling under the general MAE clause. The definition of MAE excludes
Guidant's failure, in and of itself, "to meet any internal or published
Id. § 3.01(h).
126 Govermental entities include "any Federal, state, local or foreign government, any
court, administrative, regulatory or other governmental agency, commission or authority or any
organized securities exchange." Id. § 3.01 (d).
1z7 Since June 2005, Guidant recalled approximately eighty-eight thousand defibrillators
and recalled or issued warnings for approximately two hundred thousand pacemakers. Guidant
Executive Confirms Changes Made to Defibrillator, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at B6.
'2 Guidant Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 69 (Feb. 22, 2006).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
projections, forecasts or revenue or earnings predictions., 129 The ex-
clusion, however, subsequently states that "the facts or occurrences
giving rise or contributing to such failure may be deemed to consti-
tute, or be taken into account in determining whether there has been
or would reasonably be expected to be, a Material Adverse Effect."'
130
Thus, it seems as though the parties might not have intended the
clause to cover decreases in earnings or sales in isolation. Moreover,
given the language of the agreement (the exclusion for earnings pro-
jections) and precedent (the dismissive attitude of the Tyson Foods
court towards an earnings drop), a court might hesitate to rule other-
wise. Regardless, J&J would cite the sales and earnings decreases as
symptoms of the true problem, viz., the MAEs resulting from the re-
calls, investigations, and lawsuits.
3. Whether the Events Are Materially Adverse to Guidant
Under Tyson Foods and Frontier Oil, J&J would have the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Guidant suffered a
MAC. Those cases established a high burden, viewing the alleged
MAEs under the long-term perspective of a reasonable acquirer,
which means that short-term hiccups in the target's performance will
not suffice. The Tyson Foods court recognized this high burden when
it opined that if IBP bore the burden of proving the absence of a MAC
it would not have prevailed.13 ' The court must determine whether,
from J&J's perspective, the events significantly impaired the long-
term earnings capability of Guidant. A court reviewing the events
would likely determine that they are not material under the current
standard.
First, Guidant's recalls of cardiac defibrillators and pacemakers,
though quantitatively substantial, are not material. The first recall
took five of Guidant's defibrillators, including the higher-value defi-
brillators for patients with congestive heart failure, off the market
from June 24, 2005 until August 2, 2005.132 These recalls sparked a
domino effect on Guidant's financial performance during the second
half of 2005. Worldwide sales of implantable defibrillator systems
decreased six percent and U.S. sales decreased twelve percent;
worldwide sales of pacemaker systems decreased thirteen percent and
129 Guidant Corp., Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger, § 8.03(c)
(Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 18, 2005).
130Id.
131 Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 72 n.172 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Tyson Foods v.
Aetos Corp., 818 A.2d 145 (Del. 2003).
132Guidant Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 20 (Feb. 22, 2006).
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U.S. sales decreased nineteen percent. 33 The drop in sales led to a
twenty-one percent decrease in net income.l 34 Moreover, Guidant is
heavily dependent on sales of its defibrillators: in 2004 and 2005,
sales of defibrillators represented forty-seven percent of total sales,
35
and sales of the resynchronization defibrillators for patients with con-
gestive heart failure comprised thirty-five percent of total defibrillator
sales. 1
36
Since the parties did not quantify the materiality requirement for
product recalls, J&J would cite the decreases in sales and earnings as
evidence that the recalls resulted in a MAC. To prevail on this argu-
ment, however, J&J would need to show that these decreases were
likely to continue for a significant time, but J&J would be hard-
pressed to produce such evidence, especially when considering the
rapid rate of change in Guidant's high-tech industry. Moreover, the
evidence suggests that the adverse effects of the recalls may have
already begun to subside. Although Guidant's first-quarter 2006 sales
and earnings decreased from the same period in 2005-marking the
fourth consecutive quarter of decreased sales and earnings-it re-
gained market share in the second half of 2005 after re-introducing its
recalled defibrillators. 37 Besides, products in Guidant's industry are
inherently susceptible to recalls as well as product liability claims. In
sum, the recalls did not result in a MAC because the decreases in
sales and earnings were not significant enough to show the recalls
seriously impaired Guidant's long-term earnings potential.
J&J might also argue that the eight percent decrease in total sales
and twenty-one percent decrease in earnings were MAEs. Under the
Current MAC Standard, J&J would have to produce expert evidence
showing diminution in Guidant's value or earnings potential as a re-
sult of its sub-par 2005 performance.' 38 Despite the decreases in sales
and earnings for the second half of 2005, Guidant performed better
than initially expected following the recalls in June. While Guidant
failed to meet Wall Street's expectations, the earnings decrease pales
in comparison to the sixty-four percent drop suffered by IBP in the
Tyson Foods case; therefore, the earnings drop may not represent a
material deviation from its recent past. 139
133 Id. at 21-22.134 Id. at 40.
13 5 Id. at 20, 27.
136 Burton, Safety Concerns, supra note 85.
137 Guidant Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21 (Feb. 22, 2006).
138 Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 69 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2001), affd sub nom. Tyson Foods v. Ae-
tos Corp., 818 A.2d 145 (Del. 2003).
13 9 1d. Tyson Foods should not be read to stand for the line-drawing proposition that a six-
ty-four percent decrease in earnings cannot constitute a MAC.
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Even if the decreases in sales and earnings were significant, they
were too short-term to impair Guidant's long-term earnings potential.
Under the reasonable acquirer perspective, the timeframe contem-
plated by the Tyson Foods standard is measured in years, not months,
and J&J's argument would not have the support of such long-term
expert evidence. The current evidence shows that Guidant's "business
appears to be in sound enough shape to deliver results of operations in
line with the company's recent historical performance. '"'4° J&J faces a
high burden in proving otherwise, and thus Guidant's sub-par per-
formance in 2005 does not satisfy materiality.
While Tyson Foods provides some insight into J&J's MAE argu-
ment, Frontier Oil highlights the equally high burden in asserting a
MAC based on litigation. In Frontier Oil, the parties drafted a litiga-
tion-specific MAE clause in light of the threat of a toxic-tort suit
against Frontier Oil and a subsidiary. 14 Shortly thereafter, Holly's
worst fears came to light when a Los Angeles-based law firm filed a
class-action suit, and Holly discovered that Frontier would be directly
liable for any resulting liability of its subsidiary. The court found that
the parties intended the MAE provision to cover this litigation-just
like the specific language in the Guidant agreement-but held that
Holly failed to prove that the litigation would reasonably be expected
to result in a MAC. 142 Holly's claim of financial harm to Frontier was
too speculative, and whether an event "would" or "would reasonably
be expected to" result in a MAC requires an objective test. 43
The results of the product liability suits and other legal actions
against Guidant could be enormous. Some analysts estimate potential
liability from all the suits at two billion dollars. 144 J&J, however, must
show severe harm is not merely possible but probable. Predicting the
outcome of multiple suits will be difficult, especially considering that
J&J may not be in a position to obtain the evidence required to meet
the burden. In sum, J&J would not be able to prove a diminution to
Guidant's value or long-term earnings potential.
'40Jd. at 71.
141 See supra Part I.B.ii.
142 See supra Part I.B.ii.
143 See supra Part I.Bi.
'4 Lawyer Subpoenaed for Guidant Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2006, htp://onfine.
wsj .com/article/SB 13848921681059220.html.
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IV. THE NEBULOUS NATURE OF MATERIALITY & THE ELEMENT
OF CAUSATION
A. The Problem: A MAC Standard That Focuses Solely on Materiality
Circumvents the Purpose of the MAE Clause
Just as in Frontier Oil, J&J's drafting of event-specific MAE
clauses provides it with little benefit when making its materiality ar-
gument because it still must prove materiality. Unless parties define
materiality in the agreement, courts will employ the Current MAC
Standard, which makes succeeding on a MAC argument virtually
impossible. For example, in Frontier Oil, the court saddled Holly
with the burden of trying another party's toxic tort suit to prove mate-
riality, and in Tyson Foods, Tyson Foods only produced evidence
showing an earnings impairment occurring over the span of months,
when the court required evidence showing an earnings impairment
that spanned years.
1 45
How exactly was Tyson Foods supposed to obtain this long-term
evidence? It could have refused to close and waited several years be-
fore going to court, or it could have found an expert skilled enough to
demonstrate a long-term value diminution, but both scenarios are at
least unreasonable and at most ludicrous. As to the former, Tyson
Foods would have to argue MAE as soon as IBP sued for specific
performance, which it would not wait several years to do; and as to
the latter, the expert evidence likely would lack any empirical support
and IBP would easily find an expert who could produce evidence
indicating that IBP would be a thriving business several years down
the line. Maybe the Tyson Foods court was wrong: perhaps material-
ity should be viewed in months rather than years. Otherwise, courts
will peremptorily dismiss MAE arguments premised on events whose
effects have not fully materialized at the time of suit, simply because
the evidence is too short-term to show materiality.
Moreover, as discussed above, one of the purposes of a MAC
clause is to allocate endogenous risk to the target and exogenous risk
to the acquirer. 146 Parties include exceptions for general economic or
industry conditions because the target should not suffer from an event
that it could not affect. The acquirer cannot affect that kind of risk
either, so the MAE clause stands for the principle of caveat emptor,
except to the extent that the target caused the events in question. The
MAE clause provides an acquirer with the right to terminate the deal
if the value of the target has been materially adversely affected
145 See supra note 61 (discussing the timeframe of the "reasonable acquiror" standard).
146 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 357.
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between signing and closing. The threat of the acquirer backing out
provides incentives for the target not to engage in activities that
adversely affect its value. The Current MAC Standard, however,
makes this exit right illusory, and thus negates the purpose of the
MAE clause by focusing on the degree-rather on the cause-of the
value change.
Viewing the alleged Guidant MAEs from this cause-oriented per-
spective reveals the dichotomy between materiality and causation.
While it is unclear whether Guidant's problems reached the required
degree of materiality under the Current MAC Standard, it is clear that
Guidant caused the circumstances leading to the alleged MAEs. The
Current MAC Standard fails to consider this fact, and, instead, it lets
Guidant off the hook for its actions, so long as the reduction in value
is not long-term.
Causation and materiality are not, however, the only problems
with the Current MAC Standard: due diligence and burden of proof
issues are also present. The acquirer should conduct full due dili-
gence, and the target should fairly provide all material information,
and who, if either party, failed in the due diligence process should be
a factor as well. Also, rather than placing the burden of proof on the
party invoking the MAE by default, causation should determine
which party bears the burden of proof because the party causing, and
most likely affected by, a MAC presumably has in its possession su-
perior knowledge of the cause and superior evidence of the long-term
effects of the MAE.
B. The Solution: Courts Should Respect the Purpose of the MAE
Clause and Incorporate Causation into the MAE Standard
As discussed above, the MAE clause should protect the acquirer
from those pre-signing problems of the target that are more within the
target's knowledge than the acquirer's and should motivate the target
to take post-signing actions that preserve its value. For example, Gui-
dant's problems stemmed from its pre-signing actions, and it could
have taken corrective action post-signing to mitigate the adverse ef-
fects of those problems. A MAC standard that incorporates causation
into the standard would better serve the purposes of the MAE clause.
Instead of emphasizing the extent of the value change in the target,
a court should focus on causation and ask "whether the event was
within the seller's ability to affect. ' 147 In resolving this issue, courts
could borrow from the "substantial factor" test used in imposing li-
147 Id. at 356-57.
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ability under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act148 and the associ-
ated case law on sellers of securities. 149 Under this test, a party is the
cause of an alleged MAE if its participation in the events leading to
the MAE is more than de minimis.
150
This does not altogether remove materiality from the standard-
the degree of the value change is a sine qua non of MAE arguments-
but rather makes it the second part of the analysis. Thus, a court
would determine first which party caused the events in question and
second, whether the adverse effects are material. The meaning of ma-
teriality, however, is inherently fraught with imprecision because it is
unclear when an adverse effect becomes material under the Current
MAC Standard.
A more meaningful articulation of what is material may simply be
that something is material if it is the opposite of de minimis (i.e., so
insignificant that a reasonable acquirer would overlook its occur-
rence). 151 Under this conception of materiality, a court would ask
whether the adverse effect is so minor as to suggest that a party is
invoking the MAE clause as a mere pretext for buyer's remorse.
The indefinite timeframe contemplated by the Current MAC Stan-
dard and the onerous evidentiary burden it places on the party alleg-
ing MAE compounds the ambiguity of the meaning of materiality.
The timeframe for proving materiality, however, still needs correc-
tion. If courts require evidence spanning years rather than months,
and parties asserting MAE only have access to short-term evidence,
then the definition of MAE in the merger agreement should restrict
the timeframe for proving materiality, thereby removing the material-
ity issue from the business judgment of courts.
Parties could add this time limit to the end of the MAE definition
by, for example, defining MAE as "any event that individually or in
the aggregate has had or would reasonably be expected in the eight
months following the Closing Date to have a MAC."'' 52 Or, parties
could add a provision in the merger agreement's Construction of
Terms section stating that "MAE shall be determined by looking to
the effects occurring within the eight months following the Closing
Date." Similarly, parties could place the burden of proving the ab-
sence of a MAC on the party causing the alleged MAE in a separate
1415 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (2000).
149See, e.g., SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "sub-
stantial factor... requires the participation to be more than 'de minimis').
150 "De minimis" is defined as something "so insignificant that a court may overlook it in
deciding an issue or case." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004).
1
51 Id.
152 Eight months is used arbitrarily in this example.
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Construction of Terms provision, if courts continue their failure to
recognize the significance of cause.
Using a test that considers the cause of the MAE, the judicial stan-
dard for a MAC should be that if the target was a substantial factor in
causing the event(s) resulting in the alleged MAE, and if the effect of
that event is significant enough that the acquirer is not invoking the
MAE merely as a pretext for buyer's remorse, then the effect is mate-
rial. Using the example discussed above, parties should define MAE
as "any change, event, circumstance, condition, occurrence, develop-
ment, or effect that individually or in the aggregate has had or would
reasonably be expected in the eight months following the Closing
Date to have a Material Adverse Effect."
Applying this standard and this definition to J&J's hypothetical
MAE argument could result in a different outcome, one in which J&J
prevails. Assuming the various MAE provisions cover the events in
question, a court would first determine causation. In this case, the
events all resulted from Guidant's acts or omissions. Guidant would
thus have the burden of proving the events were not material, instead
of J&J having the burden of proving a long-term diminution of Gui-
dant's value. Placing the burden of proof on Guidant could be out-
come determinative: even though Guidant would presumably be in a
better position to present evidence of the absence of a MAC, it never-
theless might not meet that burden, just like IBP would not have met
that burden in Tyson Foods had the court not placed the burden of
proof on Tyson Foods.
153
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the MAE provision is to allocate interim risk, pro-
vide the parties with incentives to preserve the value of the target by
taking certain post-signing actions, and protect the acquirer from the
target's pre-signing actions of which the acquirer did not have knowl-
edge. The Current MAC Standard, however, circumvents these pur-
poses by using a materiality test that lets the target off the hook for
problems that arise post-signing. The recent Guidant acquisition high-
lights the problem of Delaware courts' circumvention of MAE claus-
es by using a test for materiality that can almost never be met. Under
the Current MAC Standard, a court likely would have held that Gui-
dant's problems were not material. This result seems out of touch
with the purposes of the MAE clause because the agreement con-
tained MAE provisions that should have protected J&J from events
153 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that both sides would have failed to
meet their respective burdens to show a MAC or lack thereof).
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that Guidant caused. Certainly, J&J did not bargain for what hap-
pened to Guidant, and since nobody has a crystal ball, J&J should not
have to buy that for which it did not bargain-which is exactly what
the Delaware courts could have forced it to do had Boston Scientific
not had a different opinion of the value change resulting from the
MAEs affecting Guidant. On the other hand, in the Wake of Death
caused by the Current MAC Standard, parties should alter their draft-
ing to implement a more meaningful MAE definition.
JEFFREY THOMAS CICARELLA t
t J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2007, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.S.
2004, Miami University of Ohio. I would like to thank the staff for Volumes 56 & 57 of the
Case Western Reserve Law Review for all their help in editing this Note. I am also indebted to
my Note advisor, Professor George W. Dent, Jr., the Schott-van den Eynden Professor of Busi-
ness Organizations Law, as well as to my friend Richard G. Johnson for their helpful comments
and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Note. Finally, I would not now be where I am without
the continual love and support of my parents, Thomas and Ann, to whom I owe a lifelong debt
of gratitude and respect.

